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Most oj the much-needed reforms jar potent EUjoreign policy survived
the first round oj negotiations on a new Reform Treaty.
/11a strengthened post of the High Representativefor the Common Foreign
and Security Policy 1I10stof the powers imbued on the Foreign Minister
by the original Treaty 'will be kepI intact. If no dramatic changes be made,
the post of the External Relations Commissioner will also be merged with
the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
and he will still head the new External Action Service.
In times oj crisis during lastfew years there is nothing
ill the alredy existing treaties preventing the nteuteber states
front gil'iJlg the High Representative for the C0ll11110nForeign
and Security Policy a stronger role.
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1. Introduction
To the relief of those who hoped for a more
potent EU foreign pol icy, most of the much-needed
reform contained in the stranded EU Constitutional
Treaty survived the first round of negotiations on a
new Reform Treaty. In an eleventh-hour agreement
at the Council meeting in June, Chancellor Merkel
managed to secure a detailed mandate for an Inter-
governmental Conference (IGC) to review the origi-
nal text. I However, in the process of emptying the
old treaty of all that tasted of national symbolism,
the designation of the EU Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs had to be sacrificed. It is to be expected that, in
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a strengthened post of the High Representative for
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR-
CFSP), most of the powers and responsibilities im-
bued on the Foreign Minister by the original treaty
will be kept intact. If no dramatic changes be made
by the 1GC, the post of the External Relations Com-
missioner will also in the new treaty framework be
merged with the HR-CFSP. and he will still head the
new External Action Service, which brings together
the external services of the Council and the Com-
mission in one EU diplomatic service-a-although they
might not be called "diplomats" to avoid any confu-
sion with national services.
Yet even if the steps taken to provide the EU
with a stronger and less fragmented voice in inter-
national relations survive the upcoming revision by
the IGC, having one person speak on behalf of the
EU will not in itself provide it with the necessary
foreign policy leadership, since the CFSP is-and
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would have remained so under the Constitutional
Treaty framework-e-firmly in the hands of the mem-
ber state governments. In fact the relative case with
which agreement on the provisions pertaining to the
CFSP was secured ill the first place was partly due
to the fact that the Constitutional Treaty did not touch
the de facto veto power of each of the 27 member
states: most foreign policy matters have still to be
decided by unanimity. Moreover, adding another hat
to the HR-CFSP does not mean that the separate for-
eign policy structures of the Council and the Com-
111ission are merged. In practice, the largely dysfunc-
tional pi liar structure wi II remain a major obstacle
for a coherent EU foreign policy. Aiming to shed
light on some of the shortcomings and potentials con-
tained in the Constitutional Treaty recipe for a more
efficient, coherent and cohesive EU foreign policy.
this paper examines the relationship between the
office of the HR-CFSP. the Commission and the
member states, focusing in particular on the EU-3
(France. Germany and Britain). as it has evolved
since Javier Solana took office in 1999. Before mov-
ing on to the analysis. however, the paper briefly dis-
cusses those provisions in the original treaty that re-
late to foreign policy.
2. The Provisions of
the Constitutional Treaty
The establishment ofthe post ofa Union For-
eign Minister, as proposed by the original Constitu-
tional Treaty, would have represented two major in-
novations in the foreign policy area: First, it would
largely have replaced the role of the Presidency as
the official driver for and voice on matters falling
under the CFSP. Secondly, it would have brought
together the functions of The High Representative
for the CFSP CHR-CFSP) and Commissioner for
External Relations. thereby, at least in theory, im-
proving coordination between the first and the sec-
ond pi liar instruments. As regards the former, the
current arrangement of having the Presidency rotate
between the member states every six months is
widely recogniscd as inefficient and overtly suscep-
tible to national politicisation. It has largely outplayed
the role it once had in bringing different issues to
the forefront. whereas the EU's growing foreign
policy portfolio makes it virtually impossible for the
member state holding the Presidency to keep up. In
order to reduce overload and improve consistency.
each Presidency is supported by a Troika. consisting
of the preceding, the sitting and the upcoming Presi-
dencies, as well as the Council Secretariat and the
HR-CFSP. Nonetheless. although some of the smaller
member states would probably mourn the loss of six
months in the driver's seal every 12 years. one can
hardly expect policy-makers in Washington DC or
Beijing to call Lisbon one year and Vilnius the next
whenever they want Europe's opinion on a foreign
policy matter.
With regard to the division of labour between
the Foreign Minister and the President of the Euro-
pean Council, the latter. who in accordance with the
Constitutional Treaty was to be elected for a term or
two and a half years, renewable once, "shall, at his
or her level and in that capacity ensure the external
representation of the Union on issues concerning its
common foreign and security policy, without preju-
dice to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign
Affairs" (Art 1-22).2 This would have meant in prac-
tice that the day-to-day running ofthe CFSP would
have been left to the Foreign Minister, who would
have presided over the new Foreign Affairs Council
(Art 1-24.3). Other configurations of the Council of
Ministers would have been chaired by rotating teams
ofthree member states (Art 1-24.7). As stated in the
Treaty, the Foreign Minister would have been ap-
pointed by the European Council, acting by quali-
tied majority, with the agreement of the President of
the Commission (Art 1-28.1). He/she would have got
his/her mandate 1'1'0111 the member states acting
through the European Council, but would also have
been a member of the Commission. acting as one of
its Vice-Presidents. This would have meant. how-
ever, that the Foreign Minister. while reliant on gain-
ing the trust of the member states. would have been
bound by Community procedures when exercising
his/her responsibilities "incumbent on it in external
relations" within the Commission tAll \-2SA).
Giovanni Grevi ct al. have pointed out that "the
Convention formula did not amount to a merger or
two positions into one but instead it attributed to one
and the same person the exercise of two functions.
(i.e. a personal union)" (Grevi, Manca, and Quille
2004: 7). In other words, the Constitutional Treaty
did not fundamentally alter the institutional set-up.
but went rather for the somewhat half-hearted solu-
tion of delegating responsibility for coordinating the
activities of two separate foreign pol icy structures to
one person. As such. it bu iIt on and expanded the pow-
ers of the HR-CrSp, which had been a marked suc-
cess in terms of carrying forward the CFSP. One should
note. however, that Solana himself. as did former
Commissioner Chris Patten, advised against the
merger of the functions of the HR-CFSP and External
Relations Commissioner, arguing that gains in cffi-
ciency and coherence would be undermined by a con-
11 ict of interest, since the Foreign I\!Iin ister would have
to gain the trust of the member states while being
bound by the collegial rules and loyalties within the
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Commission. Rather than calling for a merger of the
external services of the Commission and Council, he
called for a clearer division of labour between them
(See CONY 342/02).
Solana's warnings were. however. never
heeded by the members of the Convention. who
hoped that having a dedicated individual lead in for-
eign policy would help ensure greater visibility, ef-
ficiency, coherence and consistency in the Union's
external relations. Accordingly, the Treaty granted
the Foreign Minister a number of powers, in addi-
tion to his coordinative role: (1) a right ofinitiative,
in that he/she "shall contribute by his or her propos-
als to the development of that policy [the CFSP]"
(Art 1-28.2); (2) a righ! of representation. as "he or
she shall conduct political dialogue on the Union's
behalf and shall express the Union's position in in-
ternational organisations and at international confer-
ences" (Art 111-197.2); and a responsibility for ilJl-
plementation, by carrying out the CFSP "as man-
dated by the Council" (Art 1-28.2). The Treaty built
on and forrnalised the role that Javier Solana as the
HR-CFSP had carved for himself since his appoint-
ment in 1999. Indeed, the position of Union Foreign
Minister seemed tailor-made for a person of Solana's
calibre, and it was more or less taken for granted
that he would fill it--and retain it until the day he
retired, one would assume.'
3. The HR·CFSP:
From Administrator to (Almost)
Foreign Minister
The decision to establish the position ofa HR-
CFSP back in 1996/97 followed a French proposal
for the creation ora ministerial level figure that would
ensure continuity, table policies and represent the
Union to the outside world (Grevi, Manca, and Quille
2004: 2). In the end. however, largely because of
British opposition, the role ofthe HR was restricted
to: assisting the presidency "in matters coming within
the scope of the common foreign and security
policy"; contributing towards the "formulation,
preparation and implementation of policy decisions";
and engaging in political dialogue "when appropri-
ate and acting on behalf of the Counci I at the request
of the Presidency" (TEU arts 18 & 26). The HR was
to act also as Secretary General of the Council. but
with emphasis on the latter function. He/she was in-
tended to fill the role of an administrator, while the
role of policy-initiator was initially played down.
When the time came for choosing an individual to
fill the post in 1999, however, the member states had
come to recognise the need for a high-profile politi-
cian rather than a diplomatic or ambassadorial fig-
ure to provide the Union with foreign policy leader-
ship. The choice fell on Javier Solana. a former
NATO Secretary General and Spanish Foreign Min-
ister (Crowe 2003: 538).
The HR was given few resources to begin with,
but the rather loose job description left considerable
wriggle room for Solana, who was also appointed
Secretary General of the WEU (Western European
Union). He has gradually carved a stronger role for
the l-IR, supported by an expanding institutional ap-
paratus. As Secretary General of the Council Secre-
tariat he has the Policy Unit, the SitCen, and the EU
Military Staff (EUMS) report directly to him; he is
the head of the newly established European Defence
Agency (EDA); and he is, as former NA"rO Secre-
tary General, trusted and respected in most Euro-
pean capitals and, therefore, increasingly given con-
siderable leeway to act on behalf of the Union. A
first showcase of the added role that Solana could
play came with the crisis in the FYROM (Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in 2001, which
was defused with the help of the shuttle diplomacy
by Solana and NATO Secretary General George
Robertson, which led to the signing of the Ohrid
peace agreement on 13 August 200 I. Solana also
played an important role, together with Chris Patten,
at the time the EU External Relations Commissioner,
in encouraging democratic opposition against
Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, and he later repeated
the feat by extending early EU support for the peace-
ful revolutions in Georgia and the Ukraine. In other
areas, however, Solana's impact has been dwarfed
by one-upmanship and search for short-term pres-
tige by successive holders of the rotating Presidency.
As Brian Crowe points out with regard to the EU's
role in the Middle East for example, it was neither
the Presidency nor the rnern bel' states that pushed
Solana forward, but rather a personal invitation from
the Egyptian president to attend the breakthrough
Sharm el Sheikh summit in 1999. This gave Solana
a route into the heart of the process, but unfortu-
nately successive presidencies have not allowed him
to exploit it." It is a fair judgement by Crowe, there-
fore, that "Solana's role, while increasing, has been
somewhat chequered, expanding incrementally and
against rather than with Brussels" (Crowe 2003: 542).
On the other hand. Solana does get a lot of
publicity, seemingly answering a need in the media
for a recognisable EU face and voice. He is by jour-
nalists routinely referred to as the EU foreign policy
chief, an exaggeration by any standards, but none-
theless contributing towards consolidating his pres-
ence and weight in the political landscape. Yet
Solana's attempts to establish a more pro-active role
for the HR remains constrained both by the fact that
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the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP gives lit-
tle leeway for him to act independently, and by the
fact that he shares his competence with the Com-
mission. In the end, it is questionable, therefore, how
much impact a double-hatting of the post of The High
Representative and External Relations Commissioner
would have had on practical coordination, since re-
sponsibilities and institutional structures remain
separate. Given the persistently sharp institutional
divide. it is likely that the double-hatted HR-CFSP
would also have to be "double-cabinetted". The risk
is that what will be-and to some degree has been-
unified at the top political level, "remains split at
the lower working levels of the hierarchy" (Grevi.
Manca. and Quille 2004: 13).
In the past, the blurring of lines of responsibil-
ity between the Commission and the Council has in-
evitably created some tension, which in turn has soured
relations between the two. Some of the grudges on
the Commission side may, however, be partly justi-
fied insofar as the CFSP has involved a gradual "sec-
ond pillarization" of the Union's foreign and security
policy. Responsibilities have shifted from the Com-
mission to the Council, for example in the area of civil
protection, which has not only caused resentment on
behalf of the Commission, but also spurred some prin-
cipal concerns. The removal of responsibilities away
from the Commission means removing policies away
from the scrutiny of the European Parliament, in ad-
dition to taking away the financial certainty that fol-
lows from inclusion in the community budget. At the
same time, the ad hoc mode in which the CFSP has
evolved has given little room for national parliaments
to scrutinise government decisions pertaining to EU
foreign policy. Looking into the El.ls first military
missions, operations Concordia in FYROM and
Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DPRC), Giovanna Bono found that governments had
informed national parliaments only after the decision
to launch an operation had been made in the Euro-
pean Council. She also found that some governments
used the pretext of lack oftime and different forms of
urgent procedures in order to bypass national parlia-
ments (Bono 2005).
A foreign policy crafted in the corridors and
backrooms in Brussels may in itself represent a
democratic problem. Surely, it has facilitated effi-
ciency, but at the cost oftransparency, since Council
minutes tell us very little about such behind the
scenes policy-making, and accountability, insofar as
neither the Presidency, the member states, nor Solana
and his aides are made to answer for or forced to
follow up on decisions made by the Council. At the
same time, the collectiveness of the Union has been
strained by enlargement, such that the foreign policy
leadership assumed by the bigger member states-
although always a significant element-has perhaps
become more visible lately.
4. What Role for the EU-3?
One response to the lack offoreign policy lead-
ership in the EU has over the years been the ten-
dency to form inner leadership groups. Indeed. most
of the major steps in the history of the CFSP, until
Maastricht known as the European Political Coop-
eration (EPC), have relied, more or less, on the ini-
tiative and common will of the big EU-3-France,
Britain and Germany. The growing difficulties of
reaching consensuses within a community of27 and
the Council Presidencies' lack of resolve when deal-
ing with important foreign policy issues, especially
when held by smaller member states, together with
the rise in ambitions and stakes in EU foreign policy,
have only reinforced the need for the leadership pro-
vided by this group. With the notable exception of
the war in Iraq, the notion of the EU-3 also seems to
have become more commonplace as well as accepted
by the smaller member states, to the extent that one
might talk about a more or less formalised directoire
(Hi II 2004).
A move in this direction became evident as
focus fell on Iran's nuclear programme, following
that which at the time seemed a successful interven-
tion in Iraq. The EU-3, wanting to avoid another war
in the region, chose to act independently of the CFSP,
as the British, French and German foreign ministers
visited Tehran on 21 October 2003, ten days before
the UN Security Council (UNSC) was to discuss the
subject. This move was in line with the EU's policy
of "constructive engagement", however, which since
the revolution in 1979 had stood in stark contrast
with the American approach. During their visit, the
EU-3 upheld the EU's offer of a Trade and Coopera-
tion Agreement (TCA) if Iran complied with the de-
mands of the International Atom ic Energy Agency
(IAEA). So, even if the EU-3 acted independently
of the EU, thus avoiding normal CFSP procedures,
they did act within the parameters of the Union'S
long-standing policy towards lran and with the im-
plicit support of the rest of the EU member states.
Solana was also soon brought on board, and has since
his first visit to Tehran in January 2004 proved an
important mediator in the dialogue between the EU
and Iran (See e.g. (Carbonell 2004). Through re-
peated visits he has kept the diplomatic channel open,
although his renowned personal charm seems to have
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chief negotiator (International Herald Tribune, 12
August 2006).
Nonetheless, a "3+ I" model, avoiding the
cumbersome procedures of the Council, yet keeping
it informed through Solana. has seemed to work fine
at least as long as the rest of Europe are happy with
the way things are being handled (Allen and Smith
2005).5 Of course, recent developments show that
"constructive engagement" has not curbed Iran's
nuclear ambitions, but at least Europe has managed
to retain communication with Tehran, as well as
avoiding another US-led war in the region. ifanother
war was or is. indeed, feasible. As has been remarked,
however. with regard to the trade concessions in re-
turn for Iran abolishing its nuclear programme; it is
normally not up to the EU-3 to give away what be-
longs to 27. The smaller member states will not ap-
prove of being reduced to passive bystanders, even
if the bigger member states defacto control the CFSP.
For example, although it has been suggested, the idea
of establishing a sort of EU Security Council to take
the lead in crises never reached the Constitutional
Treaty." Also, member states such as Italy, Spain and
Poland would be loath to see a formal directoire
model established without them. The Kaczynski
brothers quite clearly indicated, at the Brussels Coun-
cil in June 2007, that they are ready to cause trouble
if Poland's voice is not heard in the future.
As events unravelled in Lebanon during the
summer of2006, Italy was also quick to assume the
leading role when President Chirac failed to deliver
on his initial promise of2,000 troops to the UN peace-
keeping force. Moreover, when faced with this new
peak in conflict, the unity of the EU-3 seemed to
crumble again, as it did over the war in Iraq. France,
with support of most of the other EU member states,
was critical of Israel's offensive in South Lebanon
and demanded an immediate ceasefire. Britain and
Germany, on the other hand, the latter traditionally
cautious over criticising Israel as well as being ea-
ger to mend its transatlantic ties, sided with Wash-
ington and refused to condemn Israel's attack. Moreo-
ver, Solana, who reportedly entered into a flurry of
phone diplomacy with Middle East leaders before
flying to Lebanon at the height of the crisis, found
his hands tied by the Finnish Presidency which, sup-
ported by the British, refused to let him negotiate on
behalf of the Ell on the grounds that the Europeans
could not agree on how to handle the crisis (See e.g.
Economist, 26 August 2006; and United Press In-
ternational, 26 August 2006).
In the end, however, the Ell member states
managed to act as one bloc. In an emergency meet-
ing of the European foreign ministers on 25 August
2006, the member states acknowledged the need for
a strong European presence in Lebanon and prom-
ised 6,900 soldiers to the 15,000 strong UNIFIL force
(United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). Italy
confirmed that it would contribute 3,000 troops.
awaiting its reward as it succeeded France in com-
mand of the force in February 2007. The latter, on
the other hand, managed to save face by returning to
its original offer of 2,000 troops in addition to the
400 already in place in Lebanon, although only after
Chirac had called the 15,000 figure "totally exces-
sive". Interestingly, Spain is the third largest EU con-
tributor, pledging a battalion of I ,000 to 1,200 troops,
while Poland added 500 to its existing force, with
promises of more to come if needed. Hence. after a
virtual coup d'etat the three aspiring EU powers,
Italy. Spain and Poland, found themselves in the driv-
er's seat in the Middle East, saving the day after the
EU-3-as they did in Iraq-failed to provide the EU
with foreign policy leadership as a crisis mounted in
a region, which has been referred to as one of the
topmost priority areas for the Union. On the one hand,
the European response to these events confirmed that
Europe cannot trust the EU-3 to provide it with the
foreign policy leadersh ip needed, even in a situation
where the member states for the most part see eye to
eye. On the other, it showed that other member states
are able and willing to take the lead if and when the
EU-3 fails to do so, confirming rather the notion of
foreign policy leadership by variable geometry than
a move towards a formalised directoire model. As
variable geometry goes, groups of member states may
choose to deepen foreign policy cooperation and
move forward with structured cooperation (Consti-
tutional Treaty, art. 1-41.6). or they can set up more
or less formalised contact groups (as with Poland
and Lithuania in the Ukraine), which cater to indi-
vidual foreign policy interests and take advantage of
existing diplomatic relations and historic ties.' This
latter ability to appear in di fferent configurations can
be seen as an important asset of the EU. More vari-
able geometry can also create an intra-European dy-
namic where different states are induced to take the
lead within the stronger EU bloc rather than going it
alone; and get their reward in receiving ownership
of EU foreign policy. A more consistent and effi-
cient policy could in turn be ensured by formalising
a "contact group+ 1" model including Solana. How-
ever, Solana, seemingly "all over the place" already,
cannot be expected to do everything or be everywhere
at the same time." Also, as so often before last sum-
mer's events showed that once a crisis loomed and
national foreign policies were at stake, the chance to
let Solana take an early lead was forfeited.
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The examples show that in times of crisis,
when the need for one firm and consistent voice is
1110stneeded the unity among the EU member states
tends to crumble. In fact, there is nothing in the al-
ready existing treaties preventing the member states
from giving the HR-CFSP a stronger role. However,
the member states will not be dictated from Brussels
in matters where national interests are at stake, and
Solana has indicated that he will not attempt to do
so. regardless of what his title is. One of the reasons
why he has made such a success of his term as the
HR-CFSP is that he knows that, as he puts it him-
self: "sometimes you have to know the limits of what
you have, and sometimes that means disappearing at
the right time't(Quoted in international Herald Trib-
une, 12 August 2006).
Also in terms of a more coherent EU foreign
policy, the double-hatting of the Union Foreign Min-
ister would have been of limited value. The personal
union solution comes across as a second best, inso-
far as the institutional set up remains largely the same,
and the post inevitably would have been subjected
to traditional conflicts of interest, a concern that
Solana himself raised. It would, however, probably
be a good idea to extend Solana's role to cover the
whole of the EU's external relations portfolio sim-
ply because of what he has managed so far from
within the Council structures. One problem is, how-
ever, that informal and formal institutional reforms.
which have included nurturing informal political ties
and backroorn policy making, although enhancing
efficiency, has tended to remove foreign policy away
from democratic scrutiny. Th is was also what the
rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty was argu-
ably mainly about, a traditional scepticism towards
centralising power in Brussels. Somewhat ironically
then, the symbolical re-labelling of the post of For-
eign Minister together with the removal of other sym-
bols ofa nation state, regardless of the practical im-
plications of doing so, is what will probably save
the Constitutional Treaty project in the end . •
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NOTES
4 Indeed, in the Quartet, established in May 2002, which was
created in order to press for negotiations between the main par-
ties to the conflict, and which consists of the US, Russia, the
UN and the EU, the latter has found it necessary to have three
voices speaking for it (Solana, Ferrero-Waldner and the Presi-
dency).
5 It is, of course, hard to know the extent to which Solana has,
indeed, kept other member states informed, but there has been
few official objections to the way the "EU-3+1" has dealt with the
Iran issue.
6 The idea of establishing an EU Security Council was put for-
ward by members of the Convention. Hannes Farnleitner and
Reinhard E. Bosch (CONV 437/02). See also Toje 2004: 10.
7 "Variable geometry" means that not every country need to take
part in every policy but some can cooperate more closely (See
Grant 2005; and Grant and Leonard 2006).
8 The overload issue in the EU's external relations is commented
upon in Gomez and Peterson 2001.
